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Abstract
Network-enabled dynamic collaborations between busi-
nesses are increasingly common, and can evolve rapidly.
We propose a formal approach to maintaining information
security during evolution, while enabling participants to
evolve their access control policies with the coalition.
1 Introduction
There is an increasing tendency for businesses to move
away from the model of a small set of trusted collabora-
tors towards opportunistic ad-hoc collaborations. These dy-
namic collaborations form around needs and opportunities
in the market place, and evolve or are disbanded as these
needs and opportunities evolve or disappear. This capac-
ity to quickly create business-focused networks offers many
benefits, but there are many inherent risks. Today’s collabo-
rator may become tomorrow’s competitor; or two firms may
simultaneously be collaborators on one product and com-
petitors on another. As collaborators they will want to share
certain information; as competitors there will be much in-
formation that cannot be divulged.
Our goal is to assist the participants in collaborations to
control the evolution of their access control policies as they
join and leave collaborations. As collaborations evolve,
policies must necessarily evolve. At each step, each poten-
tial member is forced to make a trade-off between the risks
and the benefits. We aim to make each of these evolution-
ary steps as dependable as possible, by providing tools and
techniques to help in assessing this trade-off.
2 Our Approach
The approach we propose is outlined in Figure 1. Ini-
tially, a collaboration presents a proposed workflow to an
access control policy generator. It produces an access con-
trol policy, which must be met in order for the workflow to
Figure 1. Evolving policies in collaborations
run to completion. The policy will then divided into multi-
ple policies, one for each collaboration member. For each
member, these are the adaptions which need to be made to
their access policy in order that the collaboration can exe-
cute the workflow.
The next step is to translate each of these policies into
its formal representation, and pass these to the individual
members. Each member has to decide independently if the
proposed adaptions to their current policy are acceptable.
They are faced with two questions: 1) What access priv-
ileges need to be granted to other members in the course
of executing this workflow? and 2) Will adding these new
privileges to my existing access control policy violate my
information security policy?
We propose using testing of formal models of the access
control policies to provide support in answering these ques-
tions. The tests used will be a set of access requests together
with the expected responses. These will be derived from the
member’s information security policy.
Within the testbed, a model of the proposed adaptions is
combined with a formal model of their current access con-
trol policy. If this combination passes all the tests then the
proposed workflow should be acceptable. Otherwise, any
failures are presented to the decision maker.
If any member decides that the policy is unacceptable,
they can do more than simply signal disapproval. For ev-
ery test that fails they may use the formal model to inves-
tigate precisely why it failed, and which particular parts of
the access control policy were invoked. They can use this
information to propose alternative workflows to the collab-
oration.
Once all members agree on a workflow, they add the new
access control policy to their current policies. They may
then begin to execute the workflow.
3 Implementation
In order to realise the policy validation approach outlined
above, we require a way of generating access control poli-
cies from workflow descriptions. We expect to use an off-
the-shelf tool such as the one described in [3] for this, adapt-
ing it to divide the output into separate policies for the indi-
vidual members. For the analysis phase, we require a com-
mon framework for the policies. In our current work we are
using the OASIS standard access control policy language
XACML [5]. The analysis of these policies requires that the
policy language has a formal semantics that is susceptible to
analysis. We are using the model-oriented formal specifica-
tion language VDM++ [4] and its associated tools as a basis
for this. VDM++ specifications separate data and function-
ality, allowing us to clearly describe the access control poli-
cies and evaluation functions over them. Whilst VDM++
supports data and functional abstraction to the extent that
the full language is not executable, there is a clearly de-
fined executable subset. The VDM++ tool support (VDM-
Tools) includes an interpreter that permits the execution of
VDM++ policy evaluation functions over scripts containing
test cases. We have developed a translator from XACML
to a semantics in VDM [2]. An initial testing framework
for context free policies (those which make no reference
to information outside of that in the request) than has been
constructed [2] and is being extended to context dependent
policies (where the behaviour of the policy may be condi-
tional on external variables.) Figure 2 shows a fragment of
VDM++ invoking a test on a policy by evaluating a request
on the policy decision point (PDP).
4 Next steps
Currently our approach is based on testing of policies.
We would like to extend this to include the possibility of
proving that policies meet key information security objec-
tives. Automating this would depend on proof technology
for VDM++ which is currently being developed.
Our work allows the decision maker to to see the im-
plications of changes to access control policies. We would
like to extend it to explore wider questions of information
protected RunTest: () ==> ()
RunTest () == (
dcl pdp : PDP := CompanyPDP;
dcl req : Request :=
new Request(Anne,hazard_analysis,review);
dcl env : Env := new Env(
author_haz_an.GetExp() |-> <BoolArray>,
author_haz_an.GetExp() |->
Anne.GetExp() |-> true,
Bob.GetExp() |-> false);
dcl eval : Evaluator :=
new Evaluator(req,pdp,env);
AssertTrue(eval.evaluateRequest() = <Deny>));
Figure 2. A VDM++ test on a policy
flow within dynamic collaborations. We could allow the
user to experiment with various policies, such as those gov-
erning collaboration membership, information transfer or
delegation of duties and privileges within a collaboration.
In [1] we present a way of formally modelling a range of
dynamic collaborations in order to investigate information
flow properties between the members. Combined with the
work presented here this would allow us to add a predictive
capability to the work, allowing the decision maker to ask
“what-if” questions based on possible future scenarios. For
this, it would be important to present an intuitive graphical
interface to the user. The API provided by VDMTools will
provide a basis for this.
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